Trent W. Buck wrote:
[MUA went funny, this might be a resend. If so, sorry.]
Rohan McLeod wrote:
4/ Thus far the current model seems to be a vast centralised repository, Further problems become apparent :
- having gathered, converted and transmitted the data to this repository; complex data access permission problems seem to remain because, 'publicising ' the data in this way (even with my permission) seems to expose my GP's and respective diagnostic test providers to legal liabilities
- thus currently accessing my data would seem to involve not just my permission but the permission of the GP and if relevant the permission of any diagnostic test provider, on a per item basis !.....an extremely unwieldy arrangement This would also turn the hospital's ADSL connection into a life-critical service.
Ross J. Anderson has written UK health record policy, the most notable post being this one:
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2013/01/16/privacy-considered-harmful/
1/ No one seems to be considering just leaving the data distributed;even if only initially. Nether does their seem to be much argument " pro electronic health records for citizens ". presumably these are considered obvious; but it does no harm to spell these out. Much of the article and following comments seemed like FUD with perhaps the exception being: * "6.* Dave Walker | January 16th, 2013 at 19:04 UTC" 2/ regarding: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ross_J._Anderson "For years Anderson has been arguing that by their nature large databases will never be free of abuse by breaches of security. He has said that if a large system is designed for ease of access it becomes insecure; if made watertight it becomes impossible to use. This is sometimes known as Anderson's Rule." <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ross_J._Anderson#cite_note-14> -perhaps if some metric for 'security' (S) and ' convenience' (C) could be found; we could hypothesis S x C = some constant (K) and security design generally with increasing the value of K ? 3/ My 'philosophy of privacy' is simply ' reverse the onus of proof, aka 'demonstrate a need to know'; if some person, organisation or government department needs access to my personal information; they need to establish (to the possible satisfaction of a court of law, if necessary); that they 'need to know' certain personal information about myself ; in terms of explicit or implicit tasks demanded by me or the legislature. -Thanks for a reply by the way; regards Rohan McLeod