On 2013-07-29 18:19, Trent W. Buck wrote:
Rick Moen wrote:
Schneier has had a number of articles about creative ideas to deal with that scenario. There are some very creative people out there, and I cannot remember most of the nuances. One was a filesystem that, if you give it one key gives access to the real data but if given a different key gives access to innocuous decoy data.
Assange had a patch to ext ages ago (like, when ext2 was current) to give you multiple filesytems inside ext, with deniability.
The game theory goes something like "unless ALL blocks are allocated to filesystems you know about, you CAN'T know that I've given you all the access keys, therefore you have no reason to ever stop hitting me with that rubber hose". I'm not sure how that works in practice.
If you just mounted it as normal ext, it'd consider those secret filesystems' blocks as not reserved, so they might be trashed by writes.
For reference, the filesystem was called Marutukku or Rubberhose: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_%28file_system%29 https://github.com/sporkexec/rubberhose -- Regards, Matthew Cengia